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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
oversee most mergers and acquisitions. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) oversees electric utility mergers and acquisitions. 
In the last ten years, policy efforts have attempted to align FERC with 
the FTC/DOJ – including from within the FTC/DOJ. However, FERC 
continues to enforce its own public interest standards and use methods 
that the FTC/DOJ see as antiquated. In 2016, FERC has opened the door 
again to align with the FTC and DOJ. This paper compares the merger 
and acquisition procedures and methods used by the agencies. It argues 
that FERC should keep its identity because it casts a wider net and hence 
it is more likely to fail to identify mergers as not harmful when they are 
(false negative) even if it can over-identify mergers as harmful when 
they are not (false positives). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Breyer once stated: “When a regulatory structure exists to 
deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust 
enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits.”1  
His statement relies on the basic assumption that markets 
function efficiently through competition. Markets for utilities epitomize 
non-competitive markets; as such, they are heavily regulated. This paper 
looks more closely at the dual authority (and enforcement) over mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) of electricity utility companies. It makes two 
arguments. First, dual enforcement can be repetitive and inefficient. 
Second, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) antitrust 
standard should apply to other sectors. 
 In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act.2 This act declared 
that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”3 As such, mergers 
became regulated. In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act.4 Section 7 
of the Clayton Act prohibits the company acquisition or merger where 
                                                          
1 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 459 (2009) 
(concurring opinion). 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. 
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“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”5 The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) was entrusted to enforce the Clayton Act6 and 
regulations of mergers fell upon both the FTC and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).7 The Clayton Act, however, carved out an exemption. The 
Clayton Act did not “apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to 
authority given by the … Federal Power Commission.”8  
In 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
created. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 grants authority to the 
SEC of merger review.9 Under this Act, the SEC reviews mergers of 
publicly listed companies,10 including publicly listed companies with 
electricity producing assets. While the SEC reviews some public utility 
mergers,11 this paper focuses on FERC and DOJ/FTC review dichotomy. 
In 1977, FERC replaced the Federal Power Commission.12 
FERC “is responsible for determining whether merger and corporate 
applications are consistent with the public interest”13 under the Federal 
Power Act.14 
The authority to regulate utility mergers is shared between the 
FERC, the SEC, the FTC, and the DOJ.15 This overlap in the electricity 
                                                          
5 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
6 Id. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 18(a). 
8 Supra note 5. 
9 15 U.S.C. § 78(a); see 15 U.S.C. § 79(j). Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 79(j) 
requires acquiring parties to file an application for approval of with the SEC.  
10 15 U.S.C. § 79(i) (focusing on public utility acquisitions and mergers). 
11 The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 gave the SEC the authority 
to review mergers of holding companies that own shares into public utility 
companies. This law was effectively repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 
(Pub.L. 109–58); see Aaron M. Flynn et al., Federal Merger Review Authorities 
and Electric Utility Restructuring, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. Rl32133 
(2003). Utility holding companies need no longer register with the SEC; Nidhi 
Thakar, The Urge to Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903 (2008) (The SEC still 
reviews publicly listed companies – irrelevantly of their industry – through its 
proxy statement review Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation) 
(codified as 17 CFR 240.14a-1 - 240.14b-2)). 
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352.  
13 FERC, Mergers and Sections 201 and 203 Transactions, available at 
https://perma.cc/MK94-6574 (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
14 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b) (2006) (addressing mergers). 
15 Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (the Supreme Court ruled 
that regulation under the Federal Power Act did not immunize companies from 
3
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market has created inefficiencies and inconsistency. This paper 
investigates the inconsistent investigation standard.16 FERC enforces a 
public interest standard for merger regulations.17 The FTC and DOJ 
merger standards focus on competition.18 The SEC enforces “the public 
interest or for the protection of investors and consumers” standard.19 
 These four overlapping authorities can create inefficiencies, 
conflicts, and inconsistencies. Inefficiencies occur when more than one 
agency investigate the same merger. Conflicts occur when these agencies 
battle over merger jurisdiction. Inconsistencies occur when different 
agencies treat merger differently, setting inconsistent precedents. 
To resolve conflicts, merger regulators can either turn to (1) the 
courts to arbitrate the boundaries of their jurisdiction; (2) the Congress to 
clarify their intent and who they thought has jurisdiction; or (3) 
themselves to delegate who does what.20 Courts have not resolved this 
issue.21 Merger regulators have not yet resolved the issues. Instead, all 
                                                                                                                                  
antitrust law enforcement. Therefore, stating that the DOJ also had jurisdiction 
over the antitrust law in the electric industry). 
16 FERC also has concurrent jurisdiction with the FTC/DOJ to review mergers 
of natural gas companies under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1988). However, this paper 
focuses solely on the mergers of electric utility producing companies. 
17 16 U.S.C. §824b(a)(4)(203).  
18 The FTC asserts that it “is committed to preventing mergers and acquisitions 
that are likely to reduce competition and lead to higher prices, lower quality 
goods or services, or less innovation.” Federal Trade Commission, Merger 
Review, available at https://perma.cc/N85W-Q4DE (last visited Nov. 30, 2015); 
see United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (August 19, 2010). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 79(j). 
20 Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 198-211 
(2011) (explaining that duplicative costs can be avoided either: by 
Congressional communication to the agencies; Presidential communication; 
Court rulings).  
21 Courts have deliberated in the overlap between FERC and the SEC. Gary D. 
Levenson, FERC-SEC Overlapping Jurisdiction and the Ohio Power Litigation: 
A Loss for Ratepayers, 68 IND. L.J. 1417, 1428, 1445 (1993) (discussing how 
the SEC and the FERC have claimed jurisdiction over the same non-merger 
transaction. The court was called to intervene and ruled that the SEC had 
precedent when the rulings of the two agencies conflicted. The article goes on to 
argue that “[i]n merger and acquisition cases involving utilities that are part of 
public utility holding company systems, recent developments indicate that 
FERC's jurisdiction might be threatened as a result of the construction of section 
318 made in the trio of Ohio Power cases.”) 
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merger authorities have retained jurisdictions.22  
Congress has considered clarifying the merger jurisdictions. In 
2007, the American Modernization Commission suggested four solutions 
to Congress:23 (1) have FERC regulate mergers in the electric industry on 
its own; (2) give sole and complete authority to FTC and DOJ to regulate 
the mergers in this industry;24 (3) leave the status quo and have multiple 
merger investigators with the associated inefficiencies; (4) grant 
immunity to the industry from merger supervision.25 In 2015, Congress 
considered some of these recommendations.26  
This paper argues that FERC should remain the superior agency 
to address merger issues in the electricity industry. While the SEC has a 
part to play in merger regulation, its stated standard resembles the 
FERC’s sufficiently that this paper focuses on the conflict between 
FERC and DOJ/FTC. 
Part II describes how FERC approaches horizontal merger 
                                                          
22 “About 100 mergers involving electric utilities were proposed in the United 
State between 1992 and 2006. Two-thirds of these were electric mergers; the 
remainder were [sic] electric-gas combinations. FERC reviewed about 80 
mergers, conditioning approval in 6 percent of the cases by accepting applicants’ 
conditions or imposing new conditions. In 9 percent of mergers, the antitrust 
agencies imposed remedies.” American Bar Association. Section of Antitrust 
Law, ENERGY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTRIC & GAS 
INDUSTRIES, at 100 (2d ed. 2009). 
23 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Reports and Recommendations, April 
2007, available at https://perma.cc/Q2SS-NJ7V (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
24 As will be explained in more details below, this only solves the problem of the 
FERC. The DOJ and the FTC still would both have power to regulate merger in 
that market, and hence some efficiencies will remain as will be discussed below. 
25 The Supreme Court held that if Congress created an agency to regulate a 
certain industry, this industry should be exempted from antitrust litigation, but 
this immunity from antitrust regulation was not absolute. Credit Suisse v. 
Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 278 (2007) (holding that securities laws were 
incompatible with antitrust laws, such that securities law implicitly precluded 
antitrust claims). The Supreme Court recognizes that Congress may assure that 
immunity is not granted to the regulated industry by adding a saving clause in 
the statute creating the regulation. In the energy industry, in Otter Tail Power 
Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1973), the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
antitrust law still applies. 
26 US House Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary Committee Approves 
SMARTER Act to deliver predictability to the merger review process, Press 
Release (Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/8ZAJ-46FS (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2015). The SMARTER Act would harmonize merger review done by 
the FTC and DOJ but does not address other review process inconsistencies. 
5
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enforcement and contrasts FERC’s enforcement standards and goals with 
the FTC’s and DOJ’s. Part II discusses how the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines may affect FERC’s enforcement of mergers after looking at 
how FERC had addressed previous Merger Guidelines. Part III looks at 
the problems and benefits associated with dual enforcements. Part IV 
argues that the FERC should be granted sole custody of the electricity 
market, whether it is to regulate prices or mergers. This recommendation 
improves the efficiency of the merger review process; nonetheless, it 
may require some changes to FERC’s merger review process. 
II. MULTIPLE AGENCIES REVIEW ELECTRIC UTILITY MERGERS 
 The FTC and DOJ have prosecutorial discretion to investigate all 
mergers – including electric utility company mergers. The FERC’s 
authority is limited to (electric) utility companies. Other agencies may 
also get involved.27 The FERC and the FTC/DOJ have different 
approaches to merger investigation. These approaches reflect their 
different goals.  
To better decide who should oversee mergers, this section 
                                                          
27 Transactions involving energy companies are subject to competition policy 
review or challenge by:  
 
● One of the federal antitrust agencies (both DOJ and the FTC 
have reviewed transactions involving electric power 
producers);” 
● The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); 
● For some transactions, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (exercising powers granted by the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act); 
● The public service commission (PSC) of each state in which 
the parties do business (although it is not clear under the law 
of several states whether remedial action can be ordered by a 
single PSC over a multistate company); 
● As with other mergers, the attorney general of each state in 
which the parties do business (the attorney general may 
develop a policy position independent from and inconsistent 
with the position adopted by the public service commission); 
and 
● As with other mergers, private entities, such as competitors to 
the merging parties. 
 
The Relationship Between Antitrust Agencies and Sectoral Regulators, at i-ii, 
available at https://perma.cc/AD47-VJ48 (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
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investigates the differences. Section II.A discusses why the electricity 
market ought to be treated differently. Section II.B discusses how the 
FERC investigate mergers. Section II.C describes how the FTC and the 
DOJ investigate mergers. Section II.D examines the FTC criticisms of 
FERC’s approach and explains how FERC has attempted to follow the 
FTC recommendations. 
A. Uniqueness of the Electricity Market 
 Electricity is a unique market. Electricity has become so 
essential to society that demand does not respond well to price change. In 
economic terms, the demand for electricity is inelastic: the price 
elasticity of demand for electricity is low.28 The National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory reported that price elasticity of demand for electricity 
for residential use was low in the short29 and long run.30 Even though the 
results vary depending on the region,31 the demand for electricity remains 
inelastic. The demand for electricity intended for commercial use was 
comparably inelastic.32 
 The electricity production process exhibits large economies of 
scale.33 Most of the cost comes from the fixed cost of building a unit, the 
                                                          
28 Mark A. Bernstein, and James Griffin, Regional Differences in the Price-
Elasticity of Demand for Energy, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 
(2006), available at https://perma.cc/KKL8-KCUD (last visited 25 Nov. 2011). 
29 Id. at 76. Table D.5 (using a fixed effect estimation to derive these results and 
deal with region heterogeneity the authors found that the short run demand price 
elasticity was between -0.32 and -0.05 in the short run). 
30 Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 76 Table D.5. (finding that the long run 
demand price elasticity was between -0.62 and -0.06. The long-run elasticity is 
lower than the short run elasticity because in the long run consumer can switch 
to more cost-efficient appliances or switch to cheaper source of heat (e.g. natural 
gas)). 
31 The regional analysis attempts to address state specific variation such as 
temperature, daylight, etc., which affects electricity use. They include other 
variables like income, which affects electricity use. Bernstein et al., supra note 
28, at 14-17. 
32 Bernstein et al., supra note 28, at 77 In the short run, the price elasticity of 
demand for commercial use ran from -0.31 to -0.16 and in the long run from -
0.76 to -0.22 depending on the region.  
33 Laurits R. Christensen and William H. Greene, Economies of Scale in U.S. 
Electric Power Generation, 84 J. OF POL. ECON. 655 (1976) (using a translog 
cost function and different models, found that electric producing firms 
experience large economies of scale. They found that these firms operate at the 
flat portion of the cost curve); see John E. Kwoka Jr, Electric power 
7
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network of cables, and starting up the unit. Large fixed costs (and 
regulation) limit possible entries. In economic terms, these types of 
market are referred to as a natural monopoly.34  
Contrary to other energy resources (e.g. gas or oil), electricity 
cannot be stored. Supply is limited by the capacity of the producing units 
in the short run: consumers and producers cannot store during low price 
periods to use during high price periods. Therefore, poorly anticipating 
needs for electricity is very costly for the producer. Interestingly, the 
demand process is fairly predictable from one year to the next; however, 
it follows an upward trend.35  
Since the demand for electricity does not respond to price change 
and entry is limited, electricity producers could increase prices to 
increase revenues. To avoid this abuse of market power, the prices are 
kept low through regulations. The California electricity crisis following 
its electricity deregulation underlines the need for continued regulation.36  
Even “small changes in the competitive conditions can lead to 
substantial wealth transfers from consumers to producers as well as 
significant deadweight losses.”37 In other words, even small M&A can 
trigger dramatic change in the competitive landscape.38 The California 
electricity crisis also underlines the need for merger and acquisition 
regulation. 
 Therefore, M&A regulations need to occur to protect consumers 
from abusive behaviors. The next two sections discuss the merger 
regulating entities. 
                                                                                                                                  
distribution: economies of scale, mergers, and restructuring, 37 APPLIED ECON. 
2373 (2007). 
34 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 548, 604 (1969). 
35 Using data from the Energy Protection Agency, one can do a kernel of the 
current usage (as a ratio of capacity) of the electric plant-producing unit as a 
function of the previous year production. See Table 1. 
36 The FTC has pointed out this short-sight problem in its discussion of adoption 
of merger guidelines. However, unless the Congress told them to plan for the 
future, it seems counter-intuitive for an agency to plan in case of its own demise, 
and it could present some end-game issues if the agents are not accountable. 
FTC Comments, infra note 94. 
37 Marisam, supra note 20, at 32. 
38 The FTC discusses the impact of marginal capacity being merged with 
inframarginal. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 18. They describe what 
occurs to competition and market power when the marginal supplier merges 
with other entities; See DOJ & FTC Joint Comments, infra note 94. 
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B. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Review 
Process 
“FERC unquestionably has superior knowledge of the electric 
power industry by virtue of its oversight of transmission and wholesale 
electric generation markets.”39 Therefore, it seems almost natural that 
FERC would oversee electricity utility mergers. 
When energy utility companies want to merge, they have to 
complete and file an application with the FERC. This application must 
include “all the information necessary to explain how the merger is 
consistent with the public interest, including an evaluation of the 
merger’s effect on competition, rates, and regulation.”40 Third parties 
may also intervene and volunteer information during a 60-day comment 
period.41 The FERC then reviews the application.42  
The FERC’s review process ambiguously incentivizes 
applicants. On the one hand, applicants are incentivized to provide only 
favorable or partial evidence. First, applicants want to provide only 
favorable evidence because they know that the FERC has no subpoena 
power for merger proceedings and so it may heavily weigh the 
applicants’ self-disclosed information. To gather merger related 
information, the FERC must seek subpoenas from a federal district 
court.43 This process slows the information gathering process and 
increases merger review costs for FERC.  
Second, applicants are incentivized to provide partial 
information because FERC merger applications are subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act.44 Applicants can “claim confidentiality for 
                                                          
39 Milton A. Marquis, DOJ, FTC and FER Electric Power Merger Enforcement: 
Are There Too Many Cooks in the Merger Review Kitchen?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 783, 787 (2002). 
40 Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under the Federal Power 
Act; Policy Statement, 61 FR 68595-01, 68605, 51 (1996) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter “1996 Inquiry”]. 
41 Id. at 27. 
42 “The burden is upon the applicant to show that the proposal is consistent with 
the public interest.” Pac. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 111 F.2d 
1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1940). 
43 “Subpoenas issued by the FERC are not self-executing; rather, to enforce 
them the FERC must seek an order from a federal district court compelling 
compliance with all or part of the subpoenas.” Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. 
United States, 751 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the agency did 
not have subpoena power in order to investigate). 
44 18 C.F.R. § 388.112 (2017).  
9
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certain information included in their merger applications at the time the 
application is filed.”45 This procedure can keep competitors from 
accessing sensitive information. But co-applicants will gain access to this 
information because “parties to the proceeding may seek access to that 
information pursuant to § 388.107 of the Commission's regulations.”46 If 
the merger fails, applicants could have gained important information 
about their competitors’ business model. So, merging parties may not 
disclose some strategic information central to the FERC’s merger 
assessment. 
On the other hand, applicants are incentivized to provide as 
much as supporting evidence as possible to avoid information request 
delays. Substantial changes and supplemental supporting information can 
lead the Commission's review process to restart.47 Applicants also want 
to avoid the FERC blocking the merger because consumer associations 
volunteered contradicting evidence.48 Merging parties have to weigh the 
costs and benefits of incompleteness.  
After this investigation, the Commission emits an initial order 
“requesting additional information from the applicants or intervenors; 
setting some or all issues for a trial-type or paper hearing; approving the 
merger; or rejecting the merger.”49 Table 1 shows the decisions that the 
FERC took between 2006 and 2014 about ownership changes of electric 
utilities. The FERC classifies change of ownership cases according to 
acquisition, disposition, and merger.50 The cases are not mutually 
exclusive: some cases may involve acquisitions and dispositions.51  
 
                                                          
45 Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the Comm'n's Regs., 94 FERC 
¶ 61289 (2001). 
46 Id. 
47 1996 Inquiry, supra note 40, at 51. 
48 Marquis, supra note 39, at 786. 
49 Marquis, supra note 39, at 786. 
50 Acquisition and disposition refer to asset transfers where the two entities 
transferring assets continue to exist. The two entities end up with different 
portfolio pre- and post-transfer. Mergers refer to two entities joining their 
portfolio and becoming a single entity. 
51 For example, the FERC approved together the merger, acquisition, and 
disposition of facilities in case EC12-145-000 & EL12-107-000 involving ITC 
Holdings Corp and Entergy Corporation in 2013. ITC Corp. & Entergy Corp., 
143 FERC ¶ 61,256 (2013). 
10
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Table 1: FERC ownership change decisions for electric utility companies 
2006-2014 
 
Sources: FERC Orders all columns except Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported 
mergers; EEIA File 86 last column. 
 
 Mergers are rarer than acquisitions and dispositions. Disposition 
is the most frequent change of ownership request. Requests for further 
information remain negligible over the whole period. Thus, either the 
parties involved do not wish to delay rulings and disclose sufficient 
information or the FERC makes a ruling based on the potentially biased 
information provided. The last column shows the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) reported mergers. The EIA uses a different form to 
consider mergers. As such the reported number of mergers does not 
match the FERC classification. Because of its classification, the reported 
number of mergers by the FERC in the electric utility market is probably 
underestimated. 
C. Federal Trade Commission’s and the Department of 
Justice’s Review Process  
 The DOJ and the FTC have agreed on jurisdiction for some 
industries.52 In the electric utility industry, both agencies regulate 
mergers. For instance, the FTC was involved in the merger between DTE 
Energy and MCN Energy53 while The DOJ was involved in the merger 
between Exelon Corp. and Public Service Enterprise Group.54 In theory, 
the FTC retains jurisdiction over the energy industry;55 but in practice, 
the DOJ still uses its authority to regulate energy mergers.  
                                                          
52 The FTC and the DOJ have divided their jurisdiction according to experience 
in the industry. For instance, the FTC has jurisdiction over the automobile 
Year
Authorized 
acquisitions
Denied 
acquisitions
Authorized 
dispositions
Denied 
dispositions
Authorized 
mergers
Denied 
mergers
Request 
further 
information
Energy 
Information 
Administration 
reported mergers
2006 73 3 113 0 8 0 2 N/A
2007 45 1 98 2 4 0 0 33
2008 48 0 99 0 4 0 0 16
2009 26 0 72 1 1 0 0 12
2010 38 0 75 0 3 0 2 11
2011 19 0 98 0 4 0 0 14
2012 33 0 124 0 3 0 0 13
2013 42 0 118 1 1 0 1 9
2014 41 0 111 0 2 0 0 11
Total 365 4 908 4 30 0 5 119
Average 40.6 0.4 100.9 0.4 3.3 0 0.6 14.9
11
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The FTC and the DOJ merger review processes are more similar 
than different.56 When two entities want to merge and when these entities 
meet a certain threshold, they must submit a Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) 
filing to the FTC and the DOJ.57 These filings are strictly confidential58 
and are triggered by the amount of merger involved.59  
The investigating agency can issue a second request for 
information if it cannot rule on the merger based on information 
provided.60 The investigating agency allows third parties to intervene 
(e.g. industry participants) and provide information.61 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
industry where as the DOJ has jurisdiction over the steel industry. FTC & 
ANTITRUST DIV. OF U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE 
PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATIONS, (Mar. 5, 2002), available at 
https://perma.cc/6F6W-7EXE (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
53 The FTC ruled that the merger would be approved given easement over some 
of the gas distribution. United States v. Exelon Corp., No. 1:06CV01138 (D.D.C 
2006) (proposed final judgment), available at https://perma.cc/2MNM-TNUX 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2015).  
54 The DOJ required some divestiture before accepting the merger. Id. 
55 Id. 
56 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Public Law 94-435 codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) 
(2000), dictates the timing and procedures of the review process. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2000).  
58 15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976); e.g. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, 
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1023 (D. Conn. 1981) aff'd, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(holding that “the Attorney General of the United States is directed to retain, 
until further order of this court, all materials which were subpoenaed or created 
by the grand jury in the course of its investigation of Cuisinarts”). 
59 As of February 2016, if the mergers involve assets over $78.2 million, the 
merging entities must file an HSR filing. 81 Fed. Reg. 16, 4159, 4300 (Jan. 26, 
2016). 
60 Milton A. Marquis, Antitrust and Market Power, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 20 
(2000). 
61 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 
2.2.2-3 at 5 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at https://perma.cc/XBM3-J7EC (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. 
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Table 2: Hart-Scott Rodino pre-merger filing 2006-2014 
Fiscal Year HSR Merger Transactions 
Reported 
Percentage of Transactions 
Resulting in Second 
Request* 
2006 1,768 2.6% 
2007 2,201 3.0% 
2008 1,726 2.5% 
2009 716 4.5% 
2010 1,166 3.7% 
2011 1,450  3.9% 
2012 1,429 3.5%  
2013 1,326 3.7% 
2014 1,663 3.2% 
Total 13,445 439 second requests 
Average 1,494 3.3% 
* includes second request from both the DOJ and FTC 
Sources: Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition & 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
 
Table 2 shows the number of HSR filing over the same period. 
The FTC received more inquiries than the FERC. The second requests 
for information remain rare; however, they are higher than for the FERC 
cases. 
The investigating agency must request an injunction in Federal 
court62 if it decides to challenge the merger. Both of the investigating 
agencies carry the burden of proof that the merger is likely to 
substantially lessen competition.63 But, the injunction processes differ 
                                                          
62 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2000). 
63 For instance, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 
(1963), the Supreme Court ruled that the government was successful in proving 
that the merger will lessen competition and granted the preliminary injunction: 
“a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the 
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of 
firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially 
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the 
13
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between the FTC and the DOJ. On the one hand, the FTC must seek a 
preliminary injunction in federal district court.64 Then, the FTC may seek 
a permanent injunction.65 The FTC can also seek a permanent injunction 
through its administrative court.66 On the other hand, the DOJ must seek 
either types of injunction in federal court under Section 15 of the Clayton 
Act.67 
The procedural differences have been interpreted to mean that 
“the FTC enjoy[s] . . . a lower standard of proof for injunctive relief” 
because of its administrative option.68 This exemplifies the differences 
between the FTC and the DOJ merger review process.69  
Policy efforts have been pursued to harmonize the differences 
between the FTC and the DOJ. In 2002, the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission Act of 2002 created the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (AMC).70 The AMC Commission had: 
 
(1) to examine whether the need exists to modernize the 
antitrust laws and to identify and study related issues; 
(2) to solicit views of all parties concerned with the 
operation of the antitrust laws; 
(3) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current 
arrangements with respect to any issues so identified; 
and 
(4) to prepare and to submit to Congress and the 
President a report.71 
                                                                                                                                  
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”  
64 Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994). 
65 Id. 
66 John D. Carroll, The Widening Gap Between FTC, DOJ Merger Review, 
Law360: A LEXISNEXIS COMPANY (Jan. 6, 2009), available at 
https://perma.cc/3AGY-7YXA (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
67 Id. 
68 Shepard Goldfein & James A. Keyte, Merger Review at FTC and Department 
of Justice, 252 N.Y. L. J. 110 (2014). 
69 There are fundamental differences that are not addressed in this paper. For 
instance, the FTC is a bipartisan Commission whereas the DOJ is a cabinet 
agency. This section focuses mostly on the differences that affect mergers due to 
an objective standard of process. 
70Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
§§11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856. 
71 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION A.1 
(2007), available at https://perma.cc/R2D5-XDZ5 (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). 
[hereinafter AMC Report]. 
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The report was submitted to the President in 2007.72 This report 
describes the divergence between the FTC and the DOJ review 
standards.73 It recommended that Congress acted to realign these 
standards.74 In 2015, Congress considered the passage of the Standard 
Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules (SMARTER) 
Act.75 This Act aimed at harmonizing the differences between the FTC 
and the DOJ by elevating the FTC’s standard to the DOJ’s.76 As of 
December 2016, the Act was passed by Congress but has not been 
considered by the Senate.77 
The SMARTER Act, however, does not address the FERC’s 
authority and possible merger inconsistencies. In many respect, the 
SMARTER falls short of reaching its aim and fails to harmonize merger 
and acquisition review process. 
D. The FERC’s Attempt at Following the FTC’s and the 
DOJ’s Merger Review Approach 
This section compares the different merger processes. The FERC 
followed some of the guidelines put in place by the FTC and the DOJ. 
These agencies attempted to provide the guidance with mergers. In many 
ways, the review processes are already somewhat similar but the 
standards remain different. 
The FERC reviews utility mergers, a subset of all mergers. 
Courts recognized that the FERC’s standard of review differ from other 
Antitrust Agencies. 78 They have also acknowledged that merger review 
                                                          
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 200-01. 
74 Id. at 14. 
75 Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015, 
H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. § 4 (2016). 
76 “Under existing law, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice can review proposed mergers and acquisitions. However, the two 
antitrust agencies face different standards in court and utilize different processes 
when reviewing these transactions. The way a reviewing agency is chosen can 
appear random, as if it is decided by the flip of a coin. The SMARTER Act 
eliminates the existing disparities between the two antitrust enforcement 
agencies and ensures that companies face the same standards and processes 
regardless of which federal agency reviews the merger.” US House Judiciary 
Committee, supra note 26. 
77 114 CONG. REC. H1560-61(2016). 
78 Analysis of Horizontal Mkt. Power Under the Fed. Power Act, 134 FERC ¶ 
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was not meant to be shared with the FTC and the DOJ.  
The FERC follows a consistent-with-the-public-interest standard. 
In 1996, the FERC released an inquiry to explain its merger review 
process.79 The FTC criticized this FERC merger investigation process. In 
1998, the FTC formalized its criticisms.80  
The FTC made three broad criticisms. First, it claimed that the 
information gathering was maladapted to merger enforcement. It 
recommended that the “FERC may wish to consider altering its 
information-gathering processes to ensure that it obtains the information 
needed to conduct merger investigations.”81 The FTC asserted that the 
FERC needs to be able to subpoena accurate data from the merging 
parties and from other industry participants.82 Second, the FTC criticized 
the fundamental approach to mergers. The FTC claimed that the FERC 
needs to broaden their definition of customers to potential customers.83 
Finally, the FERC needed to go beyond market share analysis.84 The 
FTC recommended that the FERC consider other factors that affect 
coordination.85 In other words, the FTC recommended that the FERC 
aligned with the FTC. 
The FTC may, however, overstate the differences. FERC had 
already followed the FTC recommendations. The FERC had already 
aligned its merger process with its 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
the DOJ/FTC joint guidelines, and used it as its analytic framework.86 
The FERC had also already adopted similar filing requirement.87 For 
example, applicants could submit four type of information in order to 
                                                                                                                                  
61191, 5 (2011) [henceforth FERC Analysis]. 
79 U.S. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, Policy Statement Establishing 
Factors the Commission Will Consider in Evaluating Whether a Proposed 
Merger is Consistent with the Public Interest (1996). 
80 Federal Trade Commission, Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of 
Economics (Sept. 1998), available at https://perma.cc/2CLK-AJQL (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter FTC 1998 Comments]. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 2-3. 
83 Id. at 3. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, ENERGY 
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE ELECTRIC & GAS INDUSTRIES, 85 
(2002). 
87 Order No. 642, Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the 
Commission's Regulations, FERC STATS. & REGS. ¶ 31,111 (2000) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 33). 
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show that the merger would produce no-adverse effect on competition 
Applicants could submit information with regard to “(1) the potential 
adverse competitive effects of the merger; (2) whether entry by 
competitors can deter anticompetitive behavior or counteract adverse 
competitive effects; (3) the effects of efficiencies that could not be 
realized absent the merger; and (4) whether one or both of the merging 
firms is failing and, absent the merger, the failing firm's assets would exit 
the market.”88 
 The FERC often follows the lead of the FTC and the DOJ. When 
they revised the guidelines in 2010, the FERC called in March 2011 for 
an inquiry to assess “what impact the 2010 Guidelines should have, if 
any, on the Commission’s analysis of horizontal market power in its 
electric market-based rate program.”89 The 2011 notice of inquiry 
specified four queries: (1) the Commission asked whether it should 
follow the de-emphasized market definition approach or incorporate the 
new elements brought in by the FTC/DOJ guideline;90 (2) the 
Commission asked whether to adopt the higher advocated HHI 
thresholds;91 (3) the Commission asked what other aspects of the 2010 
guidelines should be adopted;92 and (4) the Commission asked whether it 
should change its process for considering mergers.93 
 The FTC answered the inquiry and encouraged the FERC to 
adopt the 2010 guidelines entirely instead of just revising portion of the 
                                                          
88 Notice of Inquiry, Analysis of Horizontal Market Power under the Federal 
Power Act, 134 FERC ¶ 61,191 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (The guidelines take a more fact-specific approach); Supra note 18, at 7-14 
(“Some of the analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects 
do not rely on market definition, although evaluation of competitive alternatives 
available to customers is always necessary at some point in the analysis”). 
91 1996 Inquiry, supra note 40 (The 1992 guidelines state that a market with an 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) below 1000 was not concentrated whereas 
2010 guidelines state that a market with an Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 
below 1500 was not concentrated) ; Supra note 18, at 18-19. 
92 1996 Inquiry, supra note 40. The inquiry actually divides the question in two 
aspects: (1) Which aspects of the guidelines should the Commission adopt and 
how? (2) How should the guideline impact the Commission’s investigation 
considering the market-based rate program? While these questions overlap, the 
last question refocuses the problem on the current system, and avoids any 
discussion of future deregulation. 
93 Id. (This issue of the process goes back to the criticism from the FTC 1998 
Comments, supra note 80, and the Commission refusing to change its approach). 
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previous FERC approach to mergers.94 The FTC answered (1) that 
“[s]trict market definition, however, is not the only an appropriate 
starting point for merger analysis, and in some situations it may not even 
be a required element of the analysis.”95 The FTC comments highlight 
that the antitrust enforcing agencies encourage a focus on substitutability 
instead of market definition;96 hence, the FTC implies that a market 
approach is outdated and the FERC should overhaul its approach. 
 Commentators disagreed about the market definition inquiry. For 
instance, economists at the Brattle Group asserted that “the Commission 
provides a reasonable guideline for merger applicants to define their 
relevant product and geographic markets”97 and should focus on applying 
its own tools. On the other hand, economists at the American Economic 
Institute stated that the market definition should be only one of many 
inquiries because, by focusing on market definition, the inquiry becomes 
too narrow.98 
 The FTC answered (2) that the use of the HHI is insufficient and 
leads to errors when evaluating the impact of a merger on competition.99 
The FTC argued that the characteristics of the electricity market do not 
allow for an approach relying on the HHI.100 The FTC argued that the 
FERC should not change the HHI thresholds in a vacuum.101  
Commentators also disagreed on the topic. The Electric 
Consumer Resource Council and the National Association of State 
                                                          
94 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Comment of the Staff of the Federal 
Trade Commission, 1, available at https://perma.cc/X7DL-AMUV (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter FTC comments]. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 Id. 
97 The Brattle Group, Comments of Romkaew Broehm, Peter Fox-Penner, Oliver 
Grawe, and James Reitzes, 10 (2011), available at https://perma.cc/9VJ6-9LR3 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter The Brattle Group Comments]. The 
comments define the current market definition as: “Suppliers are considered to 
be in the same market if their products can reach the same potential buyers.” Id. 
98 American Antitrust Institute, Comments of the American Antitrust Institute on 
Horizontal Merger Analysis and the Role of Concentration in the Merger 
Guidelines, (2001), available at https://perma.cc/6LYU-WHV6 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter AAI comments]. 
99 FTC comments, supra note 94, at 2. 
100 The FTC cites the inelastic demand, capacity constrain, transmission 
congestion, and long-term contracts as such characteristics. FTC comments, 
supra note 99, at 2. 
101 The FTC argues that changing the FTC must be accompanied by other 
changes. FTC comments, supra note 94, at 2. 
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Utility Consumer Advocates102 (NASUCA) commented that the HHI 
threshold should not be changed at all.103 The Independent Market 
Monitor encouraged no change and support keeping these lower 
thresholds because the inelastic demand for electricity requires more 
conservative thresholds.104 Economists at the Battle Group stated that the 
FERC should abandon the HHI test and focus on its own Delivered Price 
Test.105 
 The FTC argued (3) that FERC should consider powerful buyers, 
entry and efficiencies, and partial acquisitions.106 Commentators 
disagreed once more. On the one hand, the comments from the American 
Antitrust Institute argued both the partial acquisition investigation and 
the monopsony buyer investigation as well.107 On the other hand, the 
Brattle Group comments pointed out that bilateral markets and single-
price auction have different characteristics that should be addressed 
differently.108 
 The FTC did not respond to the fourth question.109 Other 
commentators, like the American Antitrust Institute, recommended a 
more confidential process110 whereas the NASUCA comments claimed 
that the nature of the process is irrelevant.111 
 Various commentators disagreed on all questions. These 
disagreements emphasize that merger analysis is anything but clear-cut. 
In 2012, the FERC elected to retain its existing policies regarding 
                                                          
102 The comments cite that the high barriers to entry, the transmission constraints 
that create local sub-markets, and the highly varying demand. Comments of the 
Electric Consumer Resource Council (ELCON) and the National Association of 
State Utility Consumer Advocates (NASUCA), 4 (2011), available at 
https://perma.cc/RNP2-VQ9T (last visited Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
NASUCA comments]. 
103 The comment argues that the FTC can change the threshold because of their 
different approach to mergers that given them “greater latitude to challenge 
transaction.” Hence agreeing with the FTC comment that the HHI cannot be 
changed in a vacuum. Id. at 5. 
104 Monitoring Analytics, LLC, Comments of the Independent Market Monitor 
for PJM, 6-7 (2011), available at https://perma.cc/BPM2-CRJR (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland]. 
105 The Brattle Group Comments, supra note 97, at 5. 
106 FTC comments, supra note 94, at 8-9. 
107 AAI comments, supra note 98. 
108 The Brattle Group Comments, supra note 97, at 7.  
109 FTC comments, supra note 94, at 2. 
110 AAI comments, supra note 98, at 7-8. 
111 NASUCA comments, supra note 102, at 5. 
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horizontal mergers focusing its inquiry on the effects on competition, on 
rates, and on regulation.112 As such, the FERC review process keeps 
mirroring the 1992 merger guidelines.113 
 In 2016, the FERC emitted another notice of inquiry to request 
comments on its market power assessment methods.114 Specifically, the 
FERC asked whether they should harmonize how they analyze market 
power during mergers and wholesale electric sales.115  
The DOJ and FTC welcomed this initiative and took this 
opportunity to offer joint comments.116 They encourage FERC once more 
to align their merger analysis with their own: use market 
                                                          
112 U.S. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Order Reaffirming 
Commission Policy and Terminating Proceeding, Docket No. RM11-14-000, 
138 FERC ¶ 61,109 RM11-14-000 (2012), available at https://perma.cc/KU83-
7XHT. 
113 Id. 
114 U.S. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Modifications to 
Commission Requirements for Review of Transactions under Section 203 of the 
Federal Power Act and Market-Based Rate Applications under Section 205 of 
the Federal Power Act, Docket No. RM16-21-000, 156 FERC ¶ 61, 214, 23 
(2016), available at https://perma.cc/G6AV-FY75. 
115 FERC specifically asked  
 
[W]hether the Commission should: (1) establish a simplified 
analysis for certain section 203 transactions that are unlikely 
to raise market power concerns; (2) add a supply curve 
analysis to section 203 evaluations; (3) improve the 
Commission’s single pivotal supplier analysis in reviewing 
market-based rate applications, and add a similar pivotal 
supplier analysis to section 203 evaluations; (4) add a market 
share analysis to review of section 203 transactions; (5) 
modify how capacity associated with long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) should be attributed in section 
203 transactions; and (6) require submission of applicant 
merger-related documents. 
 
Id. at 1-2. 
116 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, Comment of The U.S. 
Department of Justice and The Federal Trade Commission, Modifications to 
Commission Requirements for Review of Transactions Under Section 203 of the 
Federal Power Act and Market-Based Rate Applications 
Under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, Docket No. RM16-21-000, 1-2 
(Nov. 28, 2016) available at https://perma.cc/J7HN-842J (last visited Dec. 20, 
2016) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC Joint Comments]. 
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share/concentration only as the starting point instead of as screens.117 The 
FTC and the DOJ endorse the FERC’s harmonization efforts and 
encourage the FERC to adopt multiple changes.118 Most of all, they 
encouraged the FERC to use a supply curve analysis because it allows 
the FERC to better test for competitive effects and help shape better 
remedies.119 This supply analysis resembles their 2010 guidelines. These 
guidelines incorporate more factors into merger analysis in the hope to 
reach a more accurate market power assessment.120 
                                                          
117 Id. 
118 [T]he Agencies respectfully suggest that FERC consider taking the following 
actions:  
● Add a supply curve analysis to its examination of mergers 
under section 203. A supply curve analysis can give greater 
insight into competitive effects than traditional measures of 
market concentration.  
● Account for transmission constraints when defining a 
geographic market to assess market power. When binding, 
constraints can limit the size of the relevant geographic market 
to an area smaller than [Regional Transmission Organizations 
and Independent System Operators] or balancing authority 
areas.  
● Make its section 205 market power analysis as consistent as 
possible with its section 203 competitive effects analysis. In 
particular, FERC should use the same approach to defining 
geographic markets under both sections. 
● Account for incremental acquisitions in its merger analysis. If 
an applicant has made multiple acquisitions over a period of 
years, FERC may wish to analyze the competitive effects of 
the series of acquisitions. 
● Take a more flexible approach to assessing the competitive 
effects of power purchase agreements (PPAs). Because a 
PPA’s competitive effect will depend on several factors, 
FERC may wish to incorporate a wider range of information 
into its analysis of PPAs. 
● Require that applicants under section 203 submit certain 
merger-related documents. However, before it adopts such a 
requirement, FERC should be certain that it can protect 
confidential information from public disclosure. 
Id. at 4. 
119 Id. at 7-11. 
120 Id. at 22. 
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III. THE CASE AGAINST AND FOR DUAL ENFORCEMENT 
This section focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of 
having multiple agencies reviewing utility mergers. The Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC) report states that the disadvantages 
outweigh the advantages. It recommends that the FTC/DOJ should be 
reviewing all mergers – including in regulated industries like the electric 
utility industry. This section analyzes this statement in more detail. 
A. Dual Reviews Enable More Complete Enforcement 
In the electric utility market, most mergers are reviewed twice, if 
not more. Dual reviews allow enforcing agencies to (1) complement each 
other and (2) leverage specialized expertise. 
Complementarity in the M&A review process occurs in two 
ways. First, agencies may oversee different mergers. Second, agencies 
may have different procedures and remedies that lead to a complete 
enforcement. 
All merger regulating agencies have different merger 
investigatory thresholds. The FERC regulates the “[p]urchase, lease or 
otherwise acqui[sition of] an existing generation facility—(i) that has a 
value in excess of $10,000,000.”121 The DOJ and FTC review all mergers 
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. HSR premerger notification is 
required for transactions involving more than $78.2 million in assets.122 
After HSR notification, the DOJ/FTC can decide to investigate further. 
While the DOJ/FTC can insert themselves into any merger regardless of 
size, their limited resources constrains their reach. The FERC casts a 
wider net than the DOJ/FTC with respect to their threshold that requires 
notification. It likely investigates more electric utility mergers as such. 
The FERC only regulates public utilities mergers.123 The FERC’s 
public utility limitation has raised problems about the authority of the 
FERC in the past.124 For instance, in U.S. v. City of Stilwell,125 the DOJ 
                                                          
121 Federal Power Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 45 (Amended through P.L. 
114–94, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/D4ZG-7HZS. 
122 Sunshine Act Meetings, 81 Fed. Reg. 4299 (Jan. 26, 2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/USC9-HDDY. 
123 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2005). 
124 In Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 319 U.S. 61, 78 
(1943), Justice Reed and Justice Roberts disagree whether the plaintiff should 
fall under the definition of public utility. In its dissent, Justice Roberts claims 
that because the plant on generates electricity in the State of New Jersey and 
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challenged a tying arrangement between a sewage and electric power 
company.126 Tying arrangement can be anticompetitive; however, in this 
case, it would fall outside the FERC’s jurisdiction if such companies 
wanted to merge. The FTC/DOJ have a broad reach: they can regulate 
non-horizontal mergers and prevent tying arrangement or other anti-
competitive conglomerates. 
Besides investigating different targets, the FTC/DOJ and the 
FERC have different remedies. The FTC/DOJ focus on structural 
remedies to enforcement mergers: blocking mergers, requiring 
divestures, etc.127 The FERC has used these structural remedies and it 
also used other administrative enforcements.128 Since the FERC regulates 
the industry with other state actors regardless of mergers, the FERC can 
ensure that post-merging firms abide by price caps/ceilings and pass cost 
savings down to the consumers as part of the merger agreement. The 
FTC/DOJ cannot easily (and do not want to) implement such remedies.  
The U.S. Congress gives each federal agency narrow domain(s) 
to exploit division of labor and specialization in dealing with a particular 
industry. The FTC/DOJ operate across industries and through the court 
system – albeit sometimes administrative courts. Courts are ill-fitted to 
serve as regulators because regulation requires constant monitoring and 
specialized knowledge. The Supreme Court has recognized courts’ 
limitations in dealing with some industries. In Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. 
                                                                                                                                  
because it does not sell outside of state, this should not be construed as interstate 
commerce. Id. at 78. In the majority opinion, Justice Roberts points that the 
electricity was produced for the purpose to be transmitted out of state and 
therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the FERC. Id. at 71-72. The FTC/DOJ 
may have been able to challenge the merger without having to argue all the way 
to the Supreme Court whether the plaintiff fell under the public utility. 
125 U.S. v. City of Stilwell, CIV-96-196-B, 1998 WL 1120779, at *1 (E.D. OK 
1998). 
126 Joel I. Klein discusses this example and others in Making the Transition from 
Regulation to Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During the Process 
of Electric Power Restructuring, FERC Distinguished Speaker Series 
 (Jan. 21, 1998), available at https://perma.cc/M3FX-Y6MU (last visited Nov. 
27, 2011). 
127 The FTC has mostly implemented structural remedies such as divestiture or 
not enabling the merger. The FERC has opted for more administrative solutions 
such as price supervision. For more details, see Table 2 of Diana L. Moss, 
Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity, 32 REV. 
IND. ORGAN. 241, 254 (2008). 
128 Id. at 254-55. 
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Linkline Communications, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court has recognized that 
courts are a poor substitute for regulatory agencies.130 Courts have often 
deferred to these agencies and their specialized knowledge.131 The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the benefit of specialization.  
 The FERC and the FTC/DOJ have complementary expertise. 
The former has more experience with public utilities and natural 
monopolies. The FTC and the DOJ have more M&A expertise.132 
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, the FTC and the DOJ receive on 
average as many HSR notification in a year than the FERC investigate 
M&A over the eight-year period. The FERC benefit from the FTC/DOJ’s 
expertise and cost save by adapting their merger guidelines to the energy 
market.133 
B. Problems with Dual Enforcement 
 The principal problems with a dual enforcement are (1) the 
potential inconsistencies and (2) the cost duplication.  
Inconsistency has a recurring theme around dual enforcement.134 
                                                          
129 555 U.S. 438, 446 (2009). 
130 Id. at 452-53. 
131 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 838 (1984) (holding that “considerable weight should be accorded to 
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations”). 
132 The FTC and DOJ precede the FERC and was able to enforce mergers before 
the FERC. They have more institutional knowledge. The FTC started regulating 
mergers at its onset in 1914. The FTC has 80 economists and 600 lawyers on 
staff ready to investigate anticompetitive behavior.  Federal Trade Commission 
Performance & Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010, at 6, available at 
https://perma.cc/2WMV-7LGL (last visited Nov. 26 2011).  FERC was created 
in 1977 after the Federal Power Commission was dissolved and started regulated 
mergers after 1935.  
133 FERC, supra note 16. The FERC Analysis also addresses the adoption of the 
merger guidelines discussed above in more details. 
134 A number of commentators have pointed out that having dual enforcement 
leads to inconsistencies. J. Bruce McDonald, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division, Testifying in front of the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, at 55 (Dec. 5, 2005), available at https://perma.cc/A29F-Z7DB 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2011). Also, the American Bar Association submitted a 
comment to the request for public comment by the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission. Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission Regarding 
the Allocation of Authority for Review of Electric Power Mergers (July 17, 
2016), available at https://perma.cc/AYS4-Q8Q6 (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
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For instance, the merger between American Electric Power Company 
and Central and South West Corporation received inconsistent treatment 
from both merger reviewing authorities:135 the DOJ cleared the merger 
whereas the FERC approved it conditionally. The FERC required that the 
merger applicants “amend the pricing formula to adopt the rate that the 
seller could have charged if it could have sold the power elsewhere. This 
will satisfy the principle of holding the selling company harmless, but 
will not result in a price above market for the buying company.”136 This 
treatment could result in having different remedies applied to the same 
merger.137 But, implicitly, the FERC saw a danger in the merger that the 
DOJ did not recognize or found de minimis.138  
Inconsistencies go both ways. The DOJ has also opposed 
mergers that the FERC approved. For instance, the merger between 
Exelon Corporation and Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated 
was approved by the FERC whereas the DOJ opposed the merger.139 
Because of their different concerns and risk propensities, the merger 
reviewing agencies may come to different conclusions based on the same 
or different evidence. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that overlapping authority 
does not necessarily lead to inconsistencies.140 However, the Court 
weighs “the potential for bureaucratic duplication and conflict.”141 Even 
without inconsistencies, when two agencies investigate the same merger, 
they both expend scarce resources. 
Because these agencies do not share budgets, 142 they have little 
                                                          
135 Id. at 7. 
136 Am. Elec. Power Co. & Cent. & S. W. Corp., 90 FERC ¶ 61,242, 26-27 
(Mar. 15, 2000), available at https://perma.cc/EW6V-Z37D. 
137 The Commission describes the formula for the range of prices that the 
applicants may use. Id. at 27. 
138 See Moss, supra note 127, at 253 (testing how the HHI for instance varies 
depending on whether the mergers are investigated using different models). This 
analysis shows that having different analyses will lead to inconsistent HHIs and 
hence inconsistent merger enforcement. Id. 
139 Id. at 242. This transaction is discussed in more detail below. 
140 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 532, (2007) (addressing the potential 
conflict between the EPA and DOT in regulating emission of buses).  
141 Marisam, supra note 20, at 210. 
142 The FERC “is funded through costs recovered by the fees and annual charges 
from the industries it regulates.” Available at https://perma.cc/K8AJ-LRYA (last 
visited, Dec. 3, 2011); see Federal Trade Commission Performance & 
Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010, supra note 132, at 31 (HSR filing cost 
$45,000 as of February 2016. The FTC received its funding from general fund 
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interest to behave efficiently. First, they may want to free-ride on the 
other’s investigation. After all, they can gain from leaving the other 
agency dealing with the merger. Second, these agencies do not 
internalize the cost of dual investigation. Thus, they have little incentive 
to share information. Instead, to justify their budget, they are 
incentivized to reproduce investigations. 
These dual investigations increase the cost for the merging 
parties as well. Because the FERC is an administrative regulating body 
and the FTC/DOJ is a judicial body, the problem of double jeopardy does 
not arise.143 First, this dual governmental process can wear down 
merging parties.144 Most electric utility mergers will also need to clear 
the state regulating authority. Second, this dual process can lead to 
delays if one agency investigates after it finds the previous agency’s 
investigation unsatisfactory. 
 The next section weighs the cost of dual enforcements against its 
benefits. It discusses how costs can be cut. The next section argues that if 
the costs remain greater than the benefits the FERC should be the electric 
utility merger enforcer – and not the DOJ/FTC. 
                                                                                                                                  
appropriation and other fees the FTC collects for its services. The “spending 
authority derived from offsetting collections totaled $88 million ($73 million for 
HSR fees, $14 million for DNC Registry and $1 million from reimbursable 
agreements) and general fund appropriations totaled $205 million, comprising 
30 and 70 percent of new budget authority, respectively.”).  
143 Even if one agency approves the merger, the other agency may still stop it. 
However, because the FTC and DOJ have to argue an injunction in front of 
court of law, then only of the two can block the merger, but they might still 
investigate separately. Dual enforcement raises Fifth Amendment double 
jeopardy issues. “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. 
144 Electric utility mergers are also regulated by other governmental bodies. THE 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNEX 3-B: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTITRUST 
AGENCIES AND SECTORAL REGULATORS, 1-2, (Updated June 25, 2015), 
available at https://perma.cc/ZN9N-FX2N (last visited Dec. 8, 2011). 
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: WHO SHOULD BE THE SOLE 
REGULATOR? 
 In their report, 11 of the 12 Antitrust Modernization 
commissioners recommended that “[e]ven in industries subject to 
economic regulation, the antitrust agencies generally should have full 
merger enforcement authority under the Clayton Act.” 145 The report 
argues that that only one agency146 should do the merger analysis to 
avoid dual cost and inconsistencies.147 The regulatory agency should 
participate and help the DOJ or the FTC in its analysis.148 The report 
encourages Congress to move away from the public interest standard 
toward the antitrust standard.149 
 This recommendation is not new.150 This solution to the problem 
of dual enforcement has been used in the past. The regulation of mergers 
in the trucking industry and the airline industry moved from the 
regulating agency (Department of Transportation) to the DOJ in 1989.151  
                                                          
145 Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 23, at 364. The block in 
this case is really 3 folds, because even if the FTC decides not investigate, the 
DOJ can and vice versa.  
146 Marisam, supra note 20, at 244 (makes the opposite argument that duplicate 
delegation is a necessarily bad because Congress cannot “easily or cheaply 
avoid drafting duplicative delegations ex ante.” However, here the Congress can 
easily avoid this problem with a saving clause in the FPA or not granting the 
FERC with that power). 
147 Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 23, at 364. (“Review by 
two different government agencies can impose substantial and duplicative costs. 
It can also lead to conflict. The Commission recommends that the DOJ or the 
FTC should have full antitrust merger enforcement authority with respect to 
regulated industries.”). 
148 Id. at 364-65 
149 “In addition, Congress should review whether separate review under a public 
interest standard is needed to protect particular interests that cannot be 
adequately protected under application of an antitrust standard." Id. at x. 
150 For instance, Joel I. Klein recommended in 1998 that the Clayton Act and the 
DOJ remain involve in the merger regulation in Making the Transition from 
Regulation to Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During the Process 
of Electric Power Restructuring, FERC Distinguished Speaker Series, 2, (Jan. 
21, 1998), available at https://perma.cc/CP3Y-8Q3K (last visited Nov. 28, 
2011). He condemns based “any relief that requires judges or regulators to take 
on the role of constantly policing the industry. Relief generally should eliminate 
the incentive or the opportunity to act anticompetitively rather than attempt to 
control conduct directly.” Id. at 16. 
151 Id. at n.198. 
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While these markets differ from the electricity market, a number 
of lessons can be drawn from the deregulation of the airline industry: (1) 
the industry experienced entries followed by mergers, alliances, and 
bankruptcies;152 (2) competition increased somewhat but barriers to entry 
kept most markets concentrated;153 (3) the DOJ had to address price 
coordination post-deregulation.154 The most interesting observation is 
that the Department of Transportation has been criticized for its little 
oversight of mergers after the deregulation.155 These lessons have not 
fallen on deaf ears and they were raised during the testimony before the 
AMC.  
The FTC, DOJ, and FERC have not come to a voluntary 
agreement on how to deal with mergers in the electricity market. This 
section argues that contrary to the AMC if Congress ought to revisit who 
should be investigating mergers in the electricity market, it should be the 
FERC and not the FTC/DOJ.  
                                                          
152 Amalia R. Miller, Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion?, 
53 J.L. & ECON. 569, 570-71 (2010). 
153 Id. at 571. 
154 Id. at 571, 577-79, 583. Miller addresses this issue and test whether the 
consent decree in United States v. Airline Tariff Pub. Co., CIV. A. 92-2854 
(GHR), 1993 WL 95486 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1993) had an effect on prices. She first 
observed that prices first decrease than increase after the filing of the suit; 
however, she says the effect was not lasting. Id. at 577-78.  
“A natural interpretation of the pricing results is that the 
defendant airlines lowered their fares because of the 
heightened government attention during the investigation. 
However, once the settlement was in place, pricing strategy 
reverted and airfares returned to their initial levels. This 
pattern of relative price movement--a drop during the 
investigation and rise after its conclusion--may be more 
suggestive of an ineffective settlement than of a lack of 
coordination.”  
Id. at 579. 
155 Alfred E. Kahn, Surprises of Airline Deregulation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 
318 (1988), available at https://perma.cc/D9WW-FG8B. The DOT approved all 
21 mergers submitted during the 1980s. It almost gave antitrust immunity to 
code sharing, which prompted the 1992 DOJ suit. 
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A. Defenses Against Merger Inefficiencies 
 If the FTC is to become the sole merger review enforcer, the 
efficiency argument should be granted more weight.156 The 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines have acknowledged this efficiency 
defense but it remains merger specific.157 In the electricity market, this 
defense will crop up more often than not. A manufacturer can see its 
profit margin increase while price would also decrease for all consumers. 
Such a merger would be welfare improving and in the public interest.158 
Yet, it is unlikely to be sufficient for the FTC to approve the merger. 
Courts have slowly recognized an efficiency defense.159 But, this 
defense has not been very successful. For instance, this defense did not 
rescue the merger in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co..160 In this merger, two 
producers of baby-food in a triopoly market attempted to merge.161 The 
merging parties attempted to make an efficiency argument.162 They 
argued that the market would benefit from Heinz closing its competitor’s 
                                                          
156 Efficiencies are central part of natural monopoly: fewer competitors can more 
efficiently serve the market. Of course, this assumes that the competitors are 
unable to take advantage of their newly found market powers, which will 
depend on barrier to entry. See Frank A. Wolak and Shaun D. McRae, Merger 
Analysis in Restructured Electricity Supply Industries: The Proposed PSEG and 
Exelon Merger (2006), reprinted in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 30, 40 (John 
E. Kwoka, Jr and Lawrence J. White, eds., 5th ed.) (2009) which explains the 
step supply functions associated with capacity and economies of scale. 
157 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 18, at 29. 
158 Also known as a Pareto superior equilibrium.  
159 In U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 435 (2d Cir. 1945) an 
aluminum producer (ALCOA) was punished for becoming too big via mergers, 
id. at 435, and attempting to take advantage of economies of scale. Id. at 431. 
ALCOA was found guilty of monopolization however in dictum Judge Learned 
Hand talks of natural monopolies and states that “[a] market may, for example, 
be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of 
production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand.” Id. at 
430. While not directly stating it would seem that Judge Hand recognized the 
potential for an efficient defense. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 
568, 604 (1967), the Supreme Court accepted that the merger efficiencies should 
be weighed against anticompetitive effect but rejected the merging parties’ 
argument that efficiencies from advertising constituted efficiencies that could be 
achieved by creating its own product.  
160 246 F.3d 708, 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
161 Id. at 711-13. 
162 Id. at 720. 
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plant and moving its production into one plant.163 The court found that 
the cost savings offered by this merger were not sufficient.164 The court 
argued that such savings can be achieved by each merging party alone by 
competing harder.165 
 In the electricity industry, fixed costs are large. Starting up a new 
plant is costly. Firing up an existing plant is also costly. A merging party 
may wish to merge to shut down a competing plant to take greater 
advantage of economies of scale. It can be more cost efficient to have 
one large electric producing plant than one large and one small 
competing for the same market because the cost would be maintained 
artificially high and the regulator would maintain the price cap higher 
than it needs to be. 
The FTC will likely oppose such mergers in the electric market. 
Those mergers can decrease prices for consumers and increase profits for 
producers.166 The FTC does not regulate prices and the cap is outside of 
its control after all. Opposition to such mergers will occur for the sake of 
consistency, which is discussed in the next section.167 
                                                          
163 Id. at 721. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 This argument was made in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 
1285, 1305 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d sub nom., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. 
Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). The defendant argues 
that high concentration does not lead to price increase and that its statute as a 
nonprofit hospital should assure the FTC that they will act in the public interest. 
The court recognized that “more highly concentrated markets could be home to 
both lower prices and higher profit margins due to lower costs.” Id. at 1295. 
However, the court ruled against this merger, stating that the nonprofit statute 
was not enough. Id. at 1296.  
167 Another defense that may require some adjustment is the powerful buyer 
defense: commercial purchasers of electricity are large and sophisticated buyer. 
This defense to market power of the merging parties is discussed in section 8 of 
the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 18. However, like the 
efficiency defense, this defense has not been very successful. In Hosp. Corp. of 
Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner 
recognized that “the hospital industry is undergoing rapid technological and 
economic change, that the payors for most hospital services ... are large and 
knowledgeable,” in the form of insurance or the government. However, he finds 
that “these facts do detract from a conclusion that collusion in this market is a 
serious danger.” He defers to the FTC for weighing the different facts to 
determine the seriousness of the danger. 
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B. Inconsistency 
Inconsistencies between the FTC/DOJ and the FERC may be 
overstated. The FERC adopted in part the 1992 DOJ/FTC merger 
guidelines. Faced with a new guideline, it decided to retain the older 
guidelines because of the uniqueness of the energy market. The FERC 
separates itself from the other two merger regulators because it was 
given a different goal and it regulates the industry beyond mergers.  
 Thus, removing the FERC as a merger enforcer removes one 
source of inconsistency. It does not resolve all sources of the 
inconsistencies. The FTC and the DOJ continue to both enforce mergers 
in electricity. Table 3 shows the number of HSR filing that the DOJ and 
the FTC received from the years 2006 to 2014 for utility companies, 
which include electric, gas, and sanitary services companies. While the 
FERC has only review power over a subsection of these mergers, the 
results show interesting patterns. Table 3 shows the number of clearances 
to investigate that were granted by one antitrust agency to the other. 
Clearances are granted in about 10% of cases. In other words, in 90% of 
cases the DOJ and FTC keep investigating in parallel or at least did not 
yield jurisdiction. 
The SMARTER Act and the AMC favors aligning the FTC with 
the DOJ.168 It does not argue in dispossessing the FTC or the DOJ of 
their merger authority. Appointing the FERC as sole enforcer will 
circumvent any turf battle between the DOJ and the FTC over these 
mergers, which will continue even if the FTC and DOJ have the same 
procedures and the same review standards. 
 
Table 3: HRS filings for utility companies  
 
Utility companies include electric, gas and sanitary services companies. NAICS Code 221 
                                                          
168 Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 23, at 14. 
Fiscal 
Year Number
Percentage 
of total FTC DOJ Total FTC DOJ Total Number
Percentage 
of total FTC DOJ Total FTC DOJ Total
Number of 3 Digit 
Intra-Industry 
Transactions
2006 52 3.00% 3 4 7 1 0 1 44 2.50% 4 6 10 1 0 1 33
2007 54 2.60% 0 3 3 0 0 0 112 5.30% 0 6 6 0 2 2 53
2008 42 2.50% 0 3 3 0 0 0 59 3.60% 0 3 3 0 0 0 27
2009 19 2.80% 1 1 2 0 1 1 29 4.20% 0 2 2 0 1 1 14
2010 39 3.50% 1 5 6 0 3 3 45 4.00% 1 6 7 0 3 3 26
2011 35 2.50% 2 3 5 0 2 2 48 3.40% 3 3 6 0 2 2 26
2012 34 1.40% 0 1 1 0 0 0 36 2.60% 0 1 1 0 0 0 17
2013 26 2.00% 1 1 2 0 0 0 33 2.60% 1 1 2 0 0 0 19
2014 34 2.10% 0 6 6 0 0 0 42 2.60% 1 6 7 0 0 0 22
Total 335 8 27 35 1 6 7 448 10 34 44 1 8 9 237
Average 37  2.5% 1 3 4 0 1 1 50  3.3% 1 4 5 0 1 1 26
Industry of acquiring entity Industry of acquired entity
Clearance 
granted to FTC 
or DOJ
Second request 
investigations
Clearance 
granted to FTC 
or DOJ nd request investig
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However, the FTC/DOJ broad powers over all mergers give 
them a reach that the FERC does not have.169 They can investigate 
mergers with conglomerate effects that involve electric utility; 
nonetheless, the FTC has rarely investigated conglomerate mergers.170 
Thus, this argument fails to support empowering the FTC/DOJ over the 
FERC. 
 Specialization in mergers instead of specialization in the market 
seems counter-intuitive. The electricity market is unique. The FTC/DOJ 
are to enforce consistently across all industries, they will harm 
consumers at the expense of encouraging competition. The FTC/DOJ 
would protect inefficient producers at the expense of consumers. 
 This sheltering of competition contradicts the public interest 
standard that Congress wanted. It cannot be accomplished without 
putting price regulation and merger regulation in the hands of the same 
agency.171 Of course, the FTC/DOJ could regulate mergers and the FERC 
could regulate the market, and both could coordinate. Assuming that they 
can coordinate, such an approach still requires using different evidence 
or even a different standard of review in this industry. 
 An alternative solution to this inconsistency problem is to create 
an Antitrust Court or Merger Court. Specialized courts are not 
                                                          
169 See, Levenson, supra note 21, at 1452-53 (“Concern emanates from Missouri 
Basin Municipal Power Agency v. Midwest Energy Co., where FERC disclaimed 
jurisdiction over the merger of two holding companies that owned public 
utilities. FERC claimed that under FPA section 203 it did not have jurisdiction 
because the holding companies were not “public utilities” and thus not within 
the statute. ... Eventually, the new holding company merged its two subsidiary 
utilities and FERC, over the holding company's challenge, asserted jurisdiction. 
FERC approved the merger. While the jurisdictional issue in this case seems like 
a clear winner for FERC, the new holding company, Midwest Resources, may 
have been emboldened to challenge jurisdiction because of the recent erosion in 
FERC's authority.”).  
170 Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 557, 596 (2010) (“Conglomerate mergers, which are combinations of 
firms that are neither vertically nor horizontally related, do not bear the potential 
for unilateral or coordinated price effects and have not been an object of U.S. 
antitrust concern in this generation.”). 
171 To reach this goal, the FERC considers three factors: “(1) the effect on 
competition, (2) the effect on rates, and (3) the effect on regulation.” Wolak, 
supra note 156, at 36. 
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uncommon.172 An M&A court can create more consistencies, avoid 
double jeopardy issues, and compensate for the perceived lacked of the 
FERC merger enforcement experience. Specialized judges can align 
enforcement methods in different markets. They can use their experience 
to encourage best practices and set antitrust specific procedures. The 
FERC would need to change its review process and move it from an 
administrative judge to court of justice;173 nonetheless, moving to a court 
system assures a better review of all the necessary evidence. 
C. Public Interest Standard 
 Microeconomics modeling shows that the perfectly competitive 
market maximizes consumer welfare and minimizes deadweight loss. 
However, consumer welfare can also be maximized by a well-regulated 
monopoly. Even if competition avoids constant regulation, competition 
in itself is not the end goal but a proxy for maximizing consumer 
welfare.  
The public interest standard is another proxy for consumer 
welfare maximization and it applies to a broader range of the market 
including a natural monopoly. Thus, the public interest standard is not 
only a more general standard than encouraging competition, but it is also 
a more accurate statement of what a benevolent social planner, like 
Congress, wants to accomplish. 
If Congress wanted the electric market to be under the same 
standard as other markets, it would have used the same drafting language 
for the FPA and the Clayton Act. It could also have let the FTC and the 
DOJ enforce these mergers under the older Clayton Act. Thus, Congress 
may have understood that encouraging competition was not an 
appropriate standard in this market.  
The AMC report ignores this and argues that competitive 
standard is the gold standard adaptable to all situations.  
Arguably, the public interest standard is more adapted to the 
electricity market because electric utility producers behave like a natural 
monopoly. In this market, preserving competition for the sake of 
competition harms consumers and society at large. Moreover, electricity 
has become a necessity for consumers and the economy. Reliance on 
electricity leaves consumers at the mercy of electric utility companies. 
                                                          
172 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Court or the Tax Court. 
173 The change in the process should be the first modernization of the merger 
review in the electric industry: having a more confidential process would enable 
to have a more complete process as well and will enable to plan for the future. 
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The existence of regulators is almost certain in the future because the 
electric utility producers could abuse their market power.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress opened the door for multiple entities reviewing the 
same mergers. If these entities were capable of coordinating, 
inefficiencies would be avoided. Even if the FERC was no longer a 
merger enforcer, the FTC and the DOJ do not coordinate well together. 
The FERC conducts a public interest inquiry whereas the 
FTC/DOJ perform a competition inquiry. While different in theory, the 
FERC has aligned closely with the FTC/DOJ. The FTC has criticized the 
FERC for focusing on the short-term effects of price competition, 
without integrating potential competitors, and the changes in technology 
in their price evaluation, or potential entries.174 The FTC resonates as 
shortsighted. The FERC acts on the basis that it will keep regulating 
whereas the FTC thinks that de-regulation is an option. Unfortunately, 
the California experiment shows that the market is not ready for 
deregulation. 
 The FERC has been criticized for its lack of regulation during 
the California electricity crisis.175 However, the FERC has undoubtedly 
learned from the California experiment and can use this experience to 
better regulate mergers. The AMC recommendation could harm 
consumers because the natural monopolies are ill-adapted to competitive 
environments.  
The FTC/DOJ is a better merger regulator and the FERC is 
better equipped at dealing with the electricity market. Congress could 
revisit this in new iterations of the SMARTER Act or the FERC’s merger 
review power or process and should keep in mind that not all industries 
are equal. 
 
                                                          
174 Comments of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 94. 
175 J. Bruce McDonald, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 
Testifying in front of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, at 7 (Dec. 5, 
2005), available at https://perma.cc/X6JA-VFHD (last visited Nov. 28, 2011). 
(“Not much had changed in the marketplace in terms of generation assets, 
demand, transmission, and so forth, and yet the market became extremely 
volatile when California partially deregulated, FERC moved to market-based 
wholesale tariffs, and all of a sudden, we saw this extreme volatility that had not 
been present before which was very puzzling, and some of it was caused, we 
believe, by market manipulation by Enron.”).  
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